Anthony KelleyDirector of the LSU Ethics Institute Assistant Professor of Philosophy 210 Coates Hall 225–578–6311 |
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Professor Kelley specializes in theoretical and practical ethics, especially as it relates to questions concerning the nature of human flourishing. His current projects include a paper on the nature and value of pleasure and a paper about how best to taxonomize theories of welfare. His work has appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and the Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. He was previously assistant professor of philosophy and Andrew W. Mellon Faculty Fellow at Coe College. He is married to Chasity, and they have two boys, Anthony and Jackson. They live in the Laville Honors House, where Professor Kelley is currently serving a two-year term as Faculty-in-Residence. |
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B.A. in Women's and Gender Studies, Columbia University (2009) M.A. in Philosophy, Northern Illinois University (2011) Ph.D in Philosophy, University of Colorado Boulder (2020) PHIL 2020: Ethics PHIL 4943: Problems in Ethical Theory: Ethics of Artificial Intelligence PHIL 4943: Problems in Ethical Theory: Duties to Self and Future Generations PHIL 4943: Problems in Ethical Theory: Well-Being PHIL 7910: Seminar: Well-Being PHIL 4786: Selected Topics: Games Recipient of Manship Summer Research Fellowship, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, LSU (2024) Recipient of Life Worth Living Faculty Course Development Fellowship, Yale Divinity School (2024) Recipient of Research Grant, Provost’s Fund for Research & Creativity Support, LSU (2024) Recipient of Artificial Intelligence Engaged Classroom Grant, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, LSU (2023) Recipient of Faculty Travel Grant, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, LSU (2023) Recipient of Faculty Travel Grant, Provost’s Fund for Innovation in Research, LSU (2023) Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles and Chapters “The New Internalism About Prudential Value,” Philosophical Studies 182 (2025): 801–815 “A Theory of Prudential Alienation,” in Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics: Vol. 20, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), 45–70 “What Should the Desire Theorist Say About Ill-Being,” in Ill-Being: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Mauro Rossi and Christine Tappolet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), 64–80 “Subjective Theories of Ill-Being,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 46 (2022): 109–135 “The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments against Judgment Subjectivism,” Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 19 (2021): 291–310
Book Reviews Review of Guy Fletcher, The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction (Routledge, 2016), in Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2019): 679–82
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